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ARGUMENT
At bottom, the issue in this case is whether it can actually be determined
what the jury decided at the conclusion of trial in this matter. The jury's decision
is critical, because the awards found by the jury are the foundation for who is the
"successful party" in the case. Pursuant to Utah statute, the successful party is
entitled to recover their costs and attorney fees.
The Smedsmds in their Brief Of Appellees do not address the authority
cited by Pochynok which discusses the need for an unambiguous jury verdict.
Instead, the Smedsmds simply reargue what has formerly been submitted to the
trial court, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. The Smedsruds continue to
speculate on what the jury may have decided in this case and thereafter base all of
their arguments on this speculation. The only clear issue in this case, however, is
that the jury awarded Pochynok $7,076.56.
While the Smedsruds have postulated that the jury must have based its
verdict upon certain offsets to Pochynok's claims, such a position can only be
founded on rank speculation. The question that neither the parties, the trial court,
nor the appellate courts have been able to answer with any degree of certainty
based upon the current status of this case is: "What factors did the jury actually
take into account in rendering its verdict in this matter?" Without knowing the
basis for and the full meaning of the jury's verdict, justice cannot be reached in
this case.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AMBIGUITY OF THE JURY VERDICT
A verdict must import a definite meaning free from any ambiguity. Penny
v. State, 155 So. 576 (Ala. 1934); Campbell v. Kelley, 719 S.W.2d 769 (Mo.
1986); Fischer v. Howard, 111 P.2d 1059 (Or. 1954); Lorick & Lowrance v. Julius
K Walker & Co., 150 S.E.789 (S.C. 1929). Fundamental justice requires that a
verdict returned by a jury be free from inconsistency. Sanchez v. Martinez, 99
N.M. 66, 653 P.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1982). Jury verdicts are inconsistent when they
are so contradictory that they cannot be construed with certainty or when they
camiot fairly be resolved as a definite finding in favor of either party. Franklin v.
Allstate, 985 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1999). Moreover, it is the duty of a
trial judge not to receive an indefinite, imperfect, or ambiguous verdict, and to
cause the jury to retire and put their verdict in proper form after proper instructions
from the court. White v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 350 S.E.2d 788 (1986).
It is significant to note that each of the parties herein submitted proposed
special verdict forms to the trial court for submission to the jury. Rather than
using or adapting either of these proposed forms, the trial court used a simple
general verdict form. After the jury reached its verdict, neither the trial court nor
the Smedsmds asked for any clarification from the jury before the panel was
released.
As mentioned above, other jurisdictions have found that a trial court has a
duty to insure that any verdict rendered by the jury in unambiguous. Moreover, if
the Smedsruds had issues with what factors were considered by the jury in arriving
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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at its verdict, they should have raised those issues with the trial court before the
jury was released so that the issues the Smedsmds now raise concerning any
offsets to Pochynok's claims could have been resolved. In fact, Utah case law has
established that under Rule 47, U. R. Civ. P., when an insufficient verdict is
rendered, counsel has the opportunity to assert an objection and the trial court
under Rule 47 may return the jury for further deliberation with further instructions
to correct the iiTegularity, but if counsel does not avail itself of such oppoitunity
his objection to iiTegularity of the verdict is waived. Langton v. International
Transport, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971).

Here, no such

inquiry on whether offsets were actually considered by the jury was made by
either the trial court or the Smedruds' counsel. As a result, we are left with the
situation where no one can know, or ever know, exactly what factors were
considered by the jury in arriving at its verdict.
When the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals remanded this
case to the trial court for a factual determination of awards and offsets, the trial
court requested that the parties submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Significantly, on the same date the trial court received the Smedruds'
proposed findings and conclusions, the trial court adopted the same as its findings
and conclusions. Pochynok was afforded no opportunity to file any objections to
the same.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that it does not recommend that a
trial judge "mechanically adopt" the findings and conclusions as prepared by the
"prevailing party". Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1977). This is
especially true when no opportunity is provided to the other party to file objections
and/or proposed amendments to such findings and conclusions and to argue the
same to the court. While the trial court does have discretion in the adoption of
findings and conclusions, such adoption should only be made when the findings
and conclusions are clearly not contrary to the evidence.

The findings and

conclusions entered by the trial court in this case, however, are not based on any
evidence because it is unknown at this late date what the factors were that the jury
based its decision on. (A well written discussion of the inherent difficulties that
can result from the mechanical adoption of proposed findings and conclusions is
contained in Compton v. Gilmore, 560 P.2d 861 (Idaho 1977) a copy of which is
included in the addendum to this brief.)
The Smedsruds proposed findings and conclusions (which were adopted by
the trial court), only set forth precise amounts that they claim were asserted at trial.
The Smedsruds asserted $40,050.49 in claimed offsets. If this position is accepted
as accurate, and assuming the jury found these asserted offsets to be valid, it must
also be true that Pochynok was successful on at least $47,127.05 of its claims (the
sum of the claimed offset of $40,050.49, plus the $7,076.56 which the jury
actually awarded). At trial Pochynok sought recovery of $36,258.62 for fees due
to Pochynok and $20,542.95 for amounts due to its subcontractors. Interest in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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amount of $24,464.34 was also included in the $81,269.91 Pochynok claimed was
due and owing. (R. 412) As a substantial amount of interest was included in the
amount Pochynok claimed it was owed, the $81,269.91 figure (which the
Smedsruds repeatedly state is outlandish) is somewhat misleading. When interest
is deducted, the amount Pochynok was seeking totaled $56,805.56. Based upon
the trial court's own numbers, Pochynok must have been successful on a
substantial portion of its claims or at least $47,125.05 of the $56,805.56
(excluding interest) it was seeldng. Notwithstanding that even based on its own
numbers Pochynok was necessarily successful on a large part of its claims, the
trial court did not even take into account, let alone balance, Pochynok's successes
at trial and instead awarded the Smedsruds with a complete and clean win.
The trial court's numbers, however, do not even make sense and certainly
do not explain how the jury's verdict was reached. They are the result of pure
conjecture.

Moreover, there are countless equally viable but uncertain and

unsupportable scenarios which could be suggested to arrive at the jury verdict
figure, each of which scenarios, if improvidently accepted as true, could
substantially impact the prevailing party determination in this case. The only way
to reach a proper conclusion in this case is to remand this case for a new trial using
a special verdict form which fully and completely sets forth the relative awards
and offsets found by the jury. Otherwise, the prevailing party determination will
necessarily be based on rank speculation.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Pochynok respectfully requests that this Court
set aside the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law for the reason
that the same are based on speculation, and order a new trial in this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JJ_ day of September, 2006

lartmeau
Anthony R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a tme and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief Of
Appellant was served upon the following individuals by mailing a copy thereof,
postage prepaid, to said individuals at the following address this
September, 2006.
Vincent C. Rampton
Ross I. Romero
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45444
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444
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Cite as 560 P.2d861

98 Idaho 190 •
Robert W, COMPTON,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
Martha It, Compton GILMORE,
Defendant-Respondent.
No. 12058.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Feb. 25, 1977.
The District Court, Second Judicial District, Latah County,. Roy E. Mosman, J.,
entered order modifying decree of divorce
and ordering noncustodial father to "refrain from providing formal religious training" for his five-year-old daughter while
exercising.his visitation rights, and father
appealed. The Supreme Court, Bistline, J.,
held that where there was no finding that
unusual behavior child exhibited after visits
with her father was in any way caused by
the _religious differences of the parents and
where record did not indicate any compelling, reasons justifying exception to general
rule that courts should not interfere in religious matters, order that father refrain
from providing formal religious training for
his daughter was erroneously and improvidently entered; and that trial court did not
abuse ? ts discretion in limiting father's visitation to one weekend per month, six weeks
in the summer, and alternating holidays.

ings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
judge, in all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury, should find the facts specially and state separately his conclusions of
law thereon and direct entry of the appropriate judgment. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 52(a).
3. Divorce ^ 3 0 3 ( 2 )
Where, on wife's motion seeking to reduce non-custodial husband's visitation
rights, no finding was made that child's
unusual behavior exhibited after visits with
her father was in any way caused by religious differences of the parents and where
record did not indicate any compelling reasons justifying any exception to general
rule that courts should not interfere in religious matters, trial court's order, insofar as
it ordered husband to refrain from providing formal religious training for daughter,
was erroneously and improvidently entered.
I.C. § 32-705.
L Divorce «=>303(4)
On wife's motion to reduce visitation
rights of non-custodial husband, trial court
did not abuse its discretion in limiting husband's visitation to one weekend per month,
six weeks in the summer, and alternating
holidays,
Robert S. Williams, Moscow, for plaintiffappellant.

Order modifying final divorce decree
reversed and remanded with directions.

Allen V. Bowles, Moscow, for defendantrespondent.

1. Infants <^ 19.2(5), 19.3(4)
Generally, courts should maintain attitude of strict impartiality between religions
and should not disqualify any applicant for
child custody or restrain any person having
custody or visitation rights from taking
children to a particular church, except
where there is a clear and affirmative
showing that the conflicting religious beliefs affect general welfare of child.

This appeal raises a challenge to an order
modifying a final divorce decree whereby a
father was enjoined from providing religious training to his five year old daughter.
We reverse that order.

BISTLINE, Justice.

2. Trial <fc=>394(l)
While a trial court may avail itself of
assistance of counsel with respect to find-

Robert and Martha Compton were married in October, 1961, and have one child,
Kari, born on April 22,1969. Robert (plaintiff-appellant) was granted a default divorce in December of 1971, with the courtawarding custody of Kari to her mother,
Martha, and, as also requested, t(50% visitation rights" to her father, Robert
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In October of 1972, Martha (defendantrespondent) moved for a modification,
alleging difficulties in interpreting the
"50%" language. A hearing was held two
weeks later; and the decree was modified
leaving custody in Martha, with Robert's
visitation set at three weekends and one
midweek visitation per month.
In the following month, November of
1972, Martha, without consulting Robert,
made the decision that it was in Kari's best
interest for Kari to live with Robert, who
was by then married to Marilyn; Kari then
lived with Robert and Marilyn with Martha
having such visitation as she deemed proper. All of the foregoing was accomplished
without asking for any court guidance or
approval.
In the spring of 1974, however, Martha
made a new decision; this was that Kari
would be better off living with her; in
August of 1974 Kari was later returned to
Martha. Meanwhile, Martha has been living with Todd Gilmore.
On November 6, 1974, Martha (not yet
Gilmore) filed a new motion seeking to cut
Robert's visitation down to one 30-hour
weekend per month, and one summer
month, primarily alleging her belief that it
would be better for Kari if Robert's visitations were confined to what she thought
had been reasonable when she had been the
visiting parent. Eight days after the filing,
Todd and Martha culminated their two-year
courtship with a marriage ceremony, A
hearing on Martha's motions followed three
weeks after her marriage to Todd Gilmore.
An order was entered on February 10, 1975
(amended on March 19, 1975), limiting Robert's visitation to the one weekend per
month, six weeks in the summer, and alternating holidays.
Two months later Robert filed his motion
claiming a material change in circumstances due to his imminent move to Boise. He
requested extended holiday and visitation
rights, this to be in lieu of his one-a-month
weekend visits, Martha filed an opposing
affidavit in wrhich she alleged that conduct
on Robert's part tended to undermine her
relation with Kari. She contended that

Kari was "receiving input from plaintiff
(Robert) which results in her becoming temporarily antagonistic toward defendant
(Martha) and causing Kari to question defendant's basic goodness." This affidavit
goes on to say that such was evidenced by,
among other things, a remark of little Kari:
"You and Todd (Mr, Gilmore) are walking
away from God."
Robert's motion was heard in July of
1975, and an order entered on August 2,
1975, in which his future visitation and
phone call rights were spelled out in the
minutest detail. The order specified that
each party "refrain from ever speaking to
Kari about the other parent in a derogatory
manner."
Robert was also ordered to "refrain from
providing formal religious training for Kari
Compton," and the entry of such order he
assigns as error, challenging it as in violation of his (and Kari's) right to freedom of
speech and of religion as provided in both
the United States and Idaho Constitutions.
Robert argues that the restraining order is
too vague and ambiguous to be understood,
much less to be enforced by a contempt
'citation, and thus a violation of his right to
due process of law.
Martha argues that, by statute, the court
is empowered to address all issues relating
to the child's care and welfare, I.C. § 3 2 705; she contends that Robert's constitutional right to freedom of speech and religion is outweighed when it comes in conflict with.the State's interest in the welfare
of the child. She argues further that the
court order is not constitutionally vague
since its meaning, construed in light of the
whole record, is clear, She argues that:
"The Court's order requires the appellant
to restrict the meetings that Kari Compton is taken to and to restrain the significance which appellant places on the religious aspects of his home life while Kari
Compton is present"
We find no need to reach such lofty constitutional questions, The record is uncontradicted that prior to the hearing in. December of 1974, Martha had never complained,
or even intimated to Robert that his reli-
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gious guidance of Kari was creating a problem of any kind. Religion went entirely
unmentioned by the court either in oral
remarks on the conclusion of testimony or
in the order emanating from that hearing.
In her affidavit opposing Robert's request for better summer and holiday visitation rights, Martha was quick to assure the
court that "the additional time Kari has
spent at home since December 10, 1974, has
helped eliminate the confusion as to who
are authority figures in her life." Kari's
supposed "guilt" feelings and her supposed
"bizarre" behavior after visits with her father were by Martha attributed to the very
fact that there were such visits, and also to
Robert's supposed indiscreet discussion of
parental conflicts—but never as to religious
indoctrination on his part In their pleadings, neither party made any issue.regarding the other's role in Kari's upbringing,
religious, as to Robert, or nonreligious, as to
Martha,

Various recommendations regarding religious training were then made to both parents, but the court remarked, "that is not
an order. It is just a recommendation to
you." . And the. court explicitly stated:
"I can't tell you not to take her to church
. . I don't feel it. would be right
to order you not to go to church when she
is in your home."

Early in this hearing, the court announced:
"So that I don't forget what * I am going
to do in this final order, I am going to
order.you now to refrain from that kind
.of religious training of the child when *
she is. with you."

[1] The bench expressions of the trial
court were proper and wholly in accord
with the salutary genera! rule applicable to
this type of situation, which we observe, to
have been well stated by the Washington
Supreme Court as follows:
"Thus the rule appears to be well established that the court should maintain an.
attitude of strict impartiality between religions and should not disqualify any applicant for custody or restrain any person
having custody or visitation rights from,
taking the children to a particular church,
except where there is a clear and affirmative showing that the conflicting religious beliefs affect the general welfare
of the child. . , , Where the trial
court does not follow the generally established rule of noninterference in religious
matters in child custody cases without an
affirmative showing of compelling reasons for such action, we are of the opin^
ion that this is tantamount to a manifest
abuse of "discretion." Mu'noz v. Munoz, 79
Washed 810, 489'P.2d 1133, 1135 (1971)..
Here, there had been no such ''affirmative
showing that the conflicting, religious belief s.. affeci ' the general welfare of the
child.", Indeed, the court's sole relevant
finding of fact was that the child exhibited
"strange," "unusual" and "aggressive behavior" after visits with her father. No
finding was made that such behavior was in
any way caused by the religious differences
of the parents.

Robert immediately inquired, "Could.you be
explicit on that?" and the court replied, "I
will be." However, during concluding remarks, the court said only: "You're going
to have to cool it a bit about religion when
she is with you
I can't be more
specific than that."

Nor would this record support a finding
of any, "compelling reasons".^ to justify an
exception to the general rule of noninterference. Such i-easons typically are found
only in situations where "there is a serious
danger to the life or health of. a child as a
result of the religious views of a parent."

At the July, 1975, hearing virtually all
testimony on the topic of religion was elicited by the court, and this only after the
court overruled an objection by Robert's
counsel when Martha's counsel touched
upon it in examining her. As between the
parties, the testimony showed that there
had been only one communication on the
subject. Thereafter, according to Robert^
uncontradicted, testimony,, "she. (Martha)
has not made any other effort to: interfere
with my relationship with my.child as far as
religion goes/'
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Stapley v. Stapley 15 Ariz.App. 64, 485 P,2d
1181, 1187 (1971),
Had the trial court not delegated his factfinding'processes to counsel, it is doubted
that the order under challenge and necessitating this appeal would have been entered.
Clearly the trial court, in his bench remarks, expressed a different view after
first stating such an order would be entered.
[2] Some trial judges make their own
findings and conclusions, but others delegate that duty. We call attention of bench
and bar alike to a statement we recently
made:
"IRCP 52(a) requires the judge in all
actions tried upon the facts without a
jury to 'find the facts specially and state
separately [his] conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry.kof the appropriate
judgment'/' In re Estate of Stibor, 96
Idaho 162, 168, 525 P.2d 357, 358 (1974),
Therein we quoted approvingly from the
Supreme Court of New Mexico in Mora v.
Martinez, 80 N.M. 88, 451 P,2d 992, 993-4
(1969):
"'[We] take note of the fact that, although our Rule 52 differs from the federal rule, nevertheless the reasons for
both rules are the same, i. e., as an aid to
the appellate court by placing before it
the basis of the decision of the trial court;
to require' care en the part of the trial
judge in his consideration and adjudication of the facts ; and for the purposes of
res judicata and estoppel by judgment.
[Citing Barron & Holtzoff and Moore,]7"
(Emphasis added.) In re Estate of
Stibor, 96 Idaho at 163-64, 525 ,P.2d 357
at- 358,
The New Mexico court in Mora continued "
on from the above passage with the following:
"We agree with the federal cases which,
without exception, require adequate findings and insist on the exercise of an independent judgment on the part of the trial
judge in making his own findings of fact
rather than adopting those of one of the
parties.
See, among others, Edward
Valves, Inc. v. Cameron Iron Works. Inc.,

289 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1961); and United
States v, Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942 (2d
Cir, 1942); as well as Featherstone v,
Barashf 845 F,2d 246, 249 (10th Cir. 1965),
where the court aptly stated:
'Proper and adequate findings of fact
are not only mandatory, but highly
practical and salutory in the administration of justice. It has been pointed
out that the trial court is a most important agency of the judicial branch of
the government precisely because on it
rests the responsibility of ascertaining
the facts. The Supreme Court recently
underscored the responsibility of the
court with respect to findings, and was
critical of any indiscriminate dependence upon counsel in formulating them.
(Citing United States v. El "Paso Natural Gas Co., et-a/./376'U;S. 651, 84-S.Gt.
1044, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964)); Whatever
difficulties there may. be under various
circumstances in the application of the
'clearly erroneous' rule in support of
the trial court's findings, these difficulties are immeasurably compounded by
dubious findings. And when findings
wholly fail to resolve in any meaningful way the basic issues of fact in dispute, they become clearly insufficient
to permit the reviewing court to decide
the case at all, except to remand it for
proper findings by the trial court/"
(Emphasis added.) Mora v, Martinez,
451 P.2d at 994,
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas
Company, 376 U.S. 651, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 12
L,Ed.2d 12 (1964), the United States Supreme Court was faced with 130 findings of
fact and one conclusion of law which had
been drafted by the winning counsel .'and
adopted verbatim by the district court.
The Supreme Court voiced its dissatisfaction with this practice,-quoting approvingly
from the advice given by Judge J, Skelly
Wright in his "Seminars for Newly Appointed United States District Judges":
"Who shall prepare the findings? Rule
52 says the court shall prepare the findings. 'The court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions
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of law/ We all know what has happened.
Many courts simply decide the case in
favor of the plaintiff or the defendant,
have him prepare the findings of fact and
conclusions of law and sign them. This
has been • denounced by every court of
appeals save one. This is an abandonment of the duty and the trust that has
been placed in the judge by these rules.
It is a noncompliance with Rule 52 specifically and it betrays the primary purpose
of Rule 52—the primary purpose being
that the preparation of these findings by
the judge shall assist in the adjudication
of the lawsuit.
"I suggest to you strongly that you avoid
as far as you possibly can simply signing
what some lawyer puts under your nose.
These lawyers, and properly so, in' their
zeal and advocacy and their enthusiasm
are going to state the case for their side
in these findings as strongly as .they possibly can. When these findings get to the
courts of appeals they won't be worth the
paper they are written on as far as assisting the court of appeals in determining
why the judge decided the case." 376
U.S. at 656, 84 S.Ct. at 1047, n. 4.
The point is not so much that winning
counsel will be tempted to overreach.
Rather, the practice undermines the entire
judicial function itself. The point was
made most clearly by Judge Maris, speaking
for the Third Circuit;
"Obviously- the judge must have dealt
with the questions of fact and law involved in the case in the course of the
reasoning by which he has reached his
ultimate conclusion, even though his reasoning has not been articulated and put
on paper. But counsel who is called upon
to articulate and write out the' findings
and conclusions must do so without any
knowledge of the fact findings and reasoning processes through which the judge
has actually gone in reaching his decision.
"We••••strongly disapprove this practice.
For it not only imposes a well-nigh impossible task upon counsel but also flies in
the face of the spirit and purpose, if not
the letter, of rule 52(a). The purpose of
that rule is to require the trial judge to

formulate and articulate his findings of
fact and conclusions of law in the course
of his consideration and determination of
the case and as a part of his decision
making process, so that he himself may
be satisfied that he has dealt fully and
properly with all the issues in the case
before he decides it and so that the parties involved and-.this court on appeal
may be fully informed as to the bases of
his decision when it is made. Findings
and conclusions prepared ex post facto by
counsel, even though signed by the judge,
do not serve adequately the function contemphted by the rule. At most they
provide the judge with an opportunity to
reconsider the bases of his original decision but without affording the parties
any information as to what those bases
were or which.of them are being reconsidered. At worst they are likely to convict the judge of error because, as here,
they are inadequate to support his decision or because, as we have observed in
other cases, they are loaded. down with
argumentative overdetailed. partisan matter much of which is likely to be of doubtful validity or even wholly without support in the record.5* (Emphasis added.)
Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 751-52 (3d
Cir. 1965).
All-of this is not to say that a trial court
may not avail itself of assistance of counsel.
"The trial court:may invite counsel to
submit proposed findings and conclusions
of law. Indeed this practice 'is well established as a valuable aid to decision
making.1 Counsel have an obligation to
aid the court by responding to such an
invitation. Particularly in complex cases,
involving technical or scientific issues,:the
proposed findings may help the court to
avoid error.
"If the court plans to have the assistance
of counsel with regard to the findings,
the better practice is to request proposed
findings prior to decision and to make the
request of counsel for both sides. In this
way each party may present findings setting forth his theories and the evidence
that he thinks supports . those theories.
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The court may select the findings that
are correct and reject those that are
wrong. They may be restated in other
language. The court is not required to
rule specifically on the requests in making its own findings. Proposed findings
submitted by counsel are no more than
informal suggestions for the assistance of
the court. Indeed it is said in some cases
that only those findings actually made by
the court are part of the record on appeal, though it may well be doubted
whether this is in fact the rule." 9
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2578 at 702-04 (1971).
[3,4] We hold that the order of August
8, 1975, insofar as it ordered Robert Compton to refrain from providing formal religious training for Kari Compton was erroneously and improvidently entered. On the
matter of visitation, where one of the parents is required to live at some distance
from the residence of the custodial parent,
see Dawson v. Dawson, 90 Idaho 234, 409
P,2d 434 (1965),- The visitation rights afforded Robert by the court, while not raised
directly by an Assignment of Error, do not
appear to reflect any abuse of judicial discretion.
Order modifying final decree reversed
and remanded with directions to strike
from the said Order of August 2, 1975, that
portion which states:. "That plaintiff shall
refrain from providing formal religious
training for Kari Compton." In other respects affirmed,. Costs to appellant.
McFADDEN, C. J., and DONALDSON,
SHEPARD and BAKES, JJ., concur.
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Iver J. LONGETEIG,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Jack L» NEAL and Max Goodmiller,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 12052.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Feb. 25, 1977.
Action was brought for collection of
attorney fees allegedly earned in defending
defendants in previous litigation involving
collection of attorney fees. The District
Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Marion J, Callister, J., granted a motion
to dismiss defendant's appeal from magistrates court, and defendants appealed. The
Supreme Court held that since 1975 amendments to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
which required for the first time the filing
of a cost bond within ten days in order to
perfect an appeal from magistrates court to
district court, were unavailable to. appellants at time they prepared their pro se
appeal, on July 14, 1975, from magistrates
court to district court, district court erred in
applying strict requirement of new rule requiring' cost bond within ten days, particularly in view of fact that necessary appeal
bond had been deposited, in cash, with clerk
prior to time court ruled upon motion to
dismiss appeal; and that Supreme Courtwould remand cause with directions to reinstate appeal, but would not decide merits of
appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
Shepard, J., dissented. ..
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Since 1975 amendments1 to :Id'aho Rules
of Civil Procedure, which required for the
first time the filing of a-cost bond within
ten days in order to perfect 'an a^iyea'Krimi
magistrates court to district court, were
unavailable to appellants at time they prepared their pro se appeal,-on July 14/1975,
from magistrates court to district court,
district court erred in applying strict re-
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